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Establishing shareholder democracy and enforcing the one-share-one-vote 
mandatory rule in the EU have drawn much attention and controversy. In the 
pursuit of popular appeal for the proposal, EC policy-makers have tried to make 
equiproportional representation nearly an aphorism tied to corporate egalitarian 
sentiments underscoring justice, fairness and ethics. Economic justification of the 
move, however, as a value-enhancing technique of corporate governance in terms 
of fostering efficiency and competitiveness across the EU has been stunningly 
absent from the EC policy-agenda.  
Proponents of shareholder democracy in the EU (see e.g. “One share one vote is 
the way to a fairer market” by Montagnon and Munsters, FT, August 14, 2006) 
have erroneously associated conceptual doctrine of political democracy with a 
corporate procedural voting rule, and consequently have argued that such a rule is 
needed to promote more fairness, accountability, liquidity and more active takeover 
markets. Such a perspective, however, is flawed and misguided.  
First, shareholder democracy, as it emerged and evolved in the US, and contrary to 
what Montagnon and Munsters claim, is generally associated with shareholder 
empowerment and managerial accountability not with the one-share-one-vote rule. 
In the US, to the extent that a board’s response is disproportionate to the threat 
posed, and defensive measures taken create a preclusive or coercive effect upon 
shareholders in a takeover context, the shareholders can indeed discharge the 
board from effectively continuing exercising its fiduciary duties.  Moreover, after 
being in place in the US for 60 years, the one-share-one-vote mandatory rule was 
abolished based on growing recognition of the fact that it doesn’t encourage high 
standards of corporate democracy on the one hand, and individual standards of 
corporate responsibility, integrity and accountability to shareholders on the other 
hand. 
Second, academic literature is at best inconclusive as to whether differentiated 
voting rights lead to lower performance, managerial entrenchment and impair firm 
value. There is neither any clear evidence as to whether one-share-one-vote 
companies outperform multiple voting rights firms.  
Third, the one-share-one-vote mandatory rule can further exacerbate the dark side 
of institutional shareholder activism i.e. short-termism. Not surprisingly, 
institutional shareholders have taken a greater advocacy role to support the rule 
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but just for their own interest rather than that of their fellow or minority 
shareholders. Combining the rule with the application of different derivative 
techniques such as stock lending, equity swaps, direct and indirect hedges, hedge 
funds particularly can retain formally more voting control as compared to cash flow 
rights. This will effectively allow them voting more shares as compared to cash flow 
ownership, and hence, compromising long-term profitability for the sake of short-
term payoffs. Remuneration of hedge fund mangers generally composed of fixed 20 
per cents of fund’s profits and variable 1-2 per cents of total assets under 
management further exacerbates short-termism.  
Fourth, the one-share-one-vote mandatory rule combined derivative techniques will 
allow hedge funds to destroy shareholder value through proxy fights for corporate 
control, if the hedge fund’s net holding position of shares as defined by the 
difference between pure holdings and the short positions is negative. The 
destruction can take two forms. The hedge fund with a net negative position can 
block value-enhancing takeovers since any value-enhancing takeover will result in a 
net negative cash flow and hence losses from short positions. Alternatively, the 
hedge fund can vote for suboptimal tender offers in order to maximise payoffs 
associated with net short positions. Accordingly, the company can be either 
shielded from value-increasing takeovers or transferred to inefficient management. 
In both cases, the more stock prices slide and more shareholder value is destroyed, 
the more profits are made from short positions.  
Generally, there is nothing undemocratic or unfair about differentiated voting 
rights. It is no more “unfair” to protect shareholders through differentiated voting 
rights structures than to invite destruction of shareholder value by activist hedge 
funds. The one-share-one-vote rule is simply one corporate decision-making rule 
among many, and not necessarily the best one. If EC policy-makers opt-in for a 
mandatory one-share-one-vote rule across the board in the EU, it will entail 
significant regulatory costs, foster inefficiency and impair competition. Paradoxically 
it can also demote shareholder rights and disenfranchise minority shareholders in 
the EU.  
Against this background, a viable option forward, however, is to minimize legal 
intervention constraining investors’ and issuers’ choice with respect to voting and 
decision-making rules. As soon as companies make their corporate governance 
arrangements in general, and their voting, economic ownership structures and 
decision-making rules in particular publicly available during the IPO and the post-
IPO stages through periodic disclosures, there is no reason to believe that investors 
are unable to make informed decisions and legal intervention is justified. Rigorous 
enforcement of harmonized disclosure rules such as those concerning rights 
attached to securities, directors and officers, compensation, long and short 
positions, articles of incorporation and bylaws can further boost rights of minority 
shareholders and other stakeholders in the EU. 
I t  r e m a i n s  t o  b e  s e e n  h o w e v e r ,  w h e t h e r economic rationale will prevail over 
politically marketable rhetoric and delusory traps on the way to make corporate 
Europe more dynamic, efficient and competitive. 